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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation ] 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ; 
vs. ] 
ERNIE YOUNG, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
I Case No. 940350 CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ERNIE YOUNG 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant Ernie Young appeals from a decision of the Third 
Circuit Court of Salt Lake County. Young appeals the Circuit 
Court's class B Misdemeanor conviction of battery, in violation 
of Salt Lake City Code, section 11-08-020. This Court has 
jurisdiction over Young's appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
section 77-18a-l(l)(a) and section 78-2a-3(2)(d). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 
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1. Was appellant denied effective assistance of counsel 
which fell below the standard to be expected in the Salt Lake 
legal community? 
2. Did this ineffective assistance of counsel result in 
prejudice to appellant? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In establishing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
defendant must first show that counsel rendered a deficient 
performance that fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. Second, it must be shown that counsels 
deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. 
Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The following statutory provisions are determinative in this 
appeal: 
United States Constitution amendment VI: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ...have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I- Nature Of The Case 
Appellant/defendant, Ernie Young was charged by the Salt 
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Lake City Attorney with one count of Battery, a class B 
misdemeanor in violation of Salt Lake City Code, Section 11-08-
020. It was alleged that Karen Cadmen, appellant's live-in 
girlfriend, was the victim. Appellant pleaded not guilty. 
II. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
On June 20th, 1994 a jury trial was held in the Third 
Circuit Court, the Honorable Sheila K. McCleve presiding. 
Appellant was found guilty by the jury. Four days later 
appellant filed an appeal alleging ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
Statement of The Facts 
(Viewed in light of the verdict) 
On September 27, 1993, Appellant and his girlfriend Karen 
were at Karen's house making dinner together. Appellant and 
Karen began to argue about the preparation of the food. (T 27) 
Karen left the house to go to her grandmother's house. (T 27:2). 
Karen testified that she was afraid that she would have a fit. (T 
5) (She later described these fits as anxiety attacks and 
testified that she was under the care of Dr. Chase Peterson for 
the condition. (T 35)) Appellant caught up with Karen a short 
distance from their home. From across the street, Smith, the 
prosecution's only witness was watching the incident. (T 12) 
Smith testified that she thought appellant was beating 
Karen. (T 8) Smith said that she changed positions and then 
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observed Karen on the ground with appellant kneeling over her. (T 
8) Smith called the police. Later Smith testified that she saw 
appellant hit Karen twice. (T 10) 
Other important facts 
Karen, the alleged victim, emphatically denied that the 
assault or battery had ever occurred. (T 30) She testified at 
the trial that she argued with appellant but that appellant never 
used undue force upon her person. (T 30) Karen described how 
she sometimes has anxiety attacks and that appellant will 
sometimes hold her to calm her down. (T 36) 
Smith admitted that her view was somewhat obstructed in 
that she observed the alleged altercation across seven lanes of 
traffic on 400 South and then about another half block away from 
her position. (T 15) Smith did not know haw Karen had ended up 
on the ground. (T 15) When Smith finished calling the police 
she saw Karen and Appellant walk in opposite directions of each 
other. (T 15-16) When asked if Smith had seen Karen run away 
from Appellant, Smith testified that Karen walked away from 
Appellant. (T 11:10) 
During the City's case-in-chief the prosecutor first 
called Smith and then called Officer Gross. (T 17) The 
prosecutor, without any objection from defense attorney, asked 
the cop to testify to statements allegedly made by Karen. (T 20) 
Gross speculated that Karen "feared1* appellant and testified that 
Karen had fought with, struggled with, and was thrown to the 
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ground by appellant. (T 20) He was allowed to repeat this 
testimony during redirect. (T 23) 
The officer did state that he failed to observe any 
physical injuries or other objective signs of an altercation 
about Karen's person. (T 23) 
Inexplicably defense counsel adds to her client's 
injury by asking the cop if he had also talked to another unnamed 
bystander. Again Officer Gross offers gross hearsay by stating 
that the unidentified (and uncrossexaminable) passerby told him 
that the appellant was "fighting" with Karen and that he told 
appellant to "stop." (T 24) 
The City called Karen as a witness. Since she 
testified that no battery had occurred the city attorney 
attempted to impeach her in a most inappropriate manner. She, in 
numerous ways, tried to get Karen to testify that appellant had 
engaged in specific instances of prior abuse. Throughout these 
many attempts the defense counsel remained silent. Following are 
some examples of the prosecutor's efforts to obtain inadmissible 
and prejudicial evidence: 
"Have you been afraid of Ernie in the past." (T 27) 
"What about when you get in fights with him? Does he 
usually try to work it out?" (T 31) 
"ok. Has this happened before?" (T 31) 
"When you have conflicts with Ernie is it always when 
it is your problem?" (T 31) 
"Have you had physical violence in your home?" (T 31) 
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"Have you had any kind of violence with Ernie before?" 
(T 31) 
"Is it your testimony that you were never afraid of 
Ernie?" (T 39) 
"Have you ever called the police to report a crime?" 
(T 40) 
Finally, after Karen"s devastating (to the city's case) 
testimony, the prosecutor asked Officer Gross if, in his 
experience, victims often change their testimony or their 
versions of what really happened. (T 43) Appellant's attorney 
did not object to the irrelevance or the lack of foundation of 
this question. (T 43) 
Summary of The Argument 
Because defense counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness, her assistance as counsel 
was ineffective. 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the United 
States Supreme Court formulated a two-prong test to determine 
whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. 
First, the defendant must show that trial counsel's performance 
was deficient. Second, the defendant must show that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 
In the case at hand, defense counsel made a number of 
mistakes that prejudiced the defense. In fact, since the alleged 
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victim herself even denied that a battery had taken place, it is 
highly likely that the jury would have found a reasonable doubt 
and would have acquitted appellant. However, the prosecution was 
saved by defense counsel's numerous and disastrous errors and 
omissions. 
First, counsel did not adequately investigate the 
underlying facts of the case. Particularly, counsel failed to 
subpoena a crucial witness, Mr. Davini, who would have testified 
that Appellant did not use unlawful force against the alleged 
victim. (See police report dated 9/27/93). Furthermore, 
Appellant provided defense counsel with Davini's pertinent 
information before his trial and she still failed to contact him. 
(See Appellant's affidavit filed on June 8, 1994). 
Second, counsel failed to subpoena an expert witness, 
Karen's doctor, who would have informed the jury about Karen's 
anxiety attacks and what they entail. Again, Appellant provided 
defense counsel with Karen's doctor's name, address, and phone 
number as early as December, 1993 and defense counsel still 
failed to subpoena Karen's doctor. (See Appellant's Affidavit in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss dated December 20, 1993). 
Third, although Appellant wanted to testify on his own 
behalf, counsel did not allow him to testify. 
Fourth, defense counsel allowed the prosecutor to 
introduce extremely prejudicial hearsay statements by failing to 
object to their admissability. 
Fifth, defense counsel failed to object to several 
-7-
instances of prosecutorial misconduct wherein the prosecutor 
sought to elicit evidence that appellant had allegedly been 
involved in prior domestic assault situations with Karen. 
Sixth, defense counsel further prejudiced appellant's 
case by introducing damaging evidence herself. 
Therefore, appellant asks this Court to reverse the 
conviction as there is overwhelming evidence to prove that 
defendant's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. 
Argument 
I. DEFENSE COUNSEL'S REPRESENTATION FELL BELOW AN 
OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS, THUS HER 
ASSISTANCE AS COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE 
Because defense counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness, her assistance as counsel 
was ineffective. 
The United States Constitution guarantees a fair trial 
through the Due Process Clauses. Specifically, it defines the 
basic elements of a fair trial through several provisions of the 
Sixth Amendment, including the Counsel Clause: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence.U.S. CONST, amend. VI. 
Furthermore, the right to counsel has been held to be the right 
to effective assistance of counsel. McMann v. Richardson. 397 
U.S. 759 (1970). 
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To determine whether a criminal defendant has been denied 
his sixth amendment right to counsel, by reason of the 
performance of counsel, he has the burden of meeting a two-prong 
test. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance 
was deficient. Second, the defendant must show that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In particular, to satisfy the 
first prong of the test, a defendant must show that counsel made 
so serious a mistake that he was not functioning as the "counsel" 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. To satisfy the 
second prong of the test, the defendant must show that his 
counsel's mistake prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 687. 
In the case at hand, defense counsel's critical mistakes 
hurt appellant from two directions. First, she allowed the 
prosecutor to introduce extremely damaging and clearly 
inadmissible evidence by failing to make appropriate objections. 
(In fact she helped the prosecution by offering evidence damaging 
to her own client.) Then, she further damaged her client's 
chance for a fair trial by failing to obtain and introduce 
evidence favorable to appellant's position. 
II. 
WHERE COUNSEL FAILS TO ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATE THE 
UNDERLYING FACTS OF A CASE, COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE 
CANNOT BE VIEWED AS REASONABLE 
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Because counsel failed to read a police report which 
supplies the information of a crucial witness, and as a 
consequence, failed to issue a subpoena to the witness, counsel's 
performance cannot be viewed as reasonable. Under Utah law, if 
defense counsel fails to adequately investigate the underlying 
facts of a case, counsel's performance cannot be viewed as 
reasonable. State v. Tempiin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990). 
In State v. Tempiin> 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), the 
defendant's trial attorney failed to speak with or call as 
witnesses several people who had seen the defendant and the 
victim together on the date of the alleged rape. The Supreme 
Court of Utah found that because the defendant's trial counsel 
did not make a reasonable investigation into the possibility of 
procuring prospective defense witnesses, the first part of the 
Strickland test had been met. Tempiin, 805 P.2d at 188. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that because several of the 
people who were not called as witnesses would have testified to 
the amount of consensual physical contact between the defendant 
and the alleged victim, the second prong of the Strickland test 
had been met. Id. at 188. 
Likewise, in the case at hand, defendant's trial counsel 
failed to adequately investigate the underlying facts of this 
case. First, defense counsel did not subpoena Davini, who would 
have testified that Appellant did not use unlawful force against 
Karen. (See Appellant's affidavit filed on June 8, 1994). 
Davini witnessed the alleged incident from approximately the same 
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distance that Amanda Smith, ("Smith") the prosecution's witness, 
did. In fact, Davini probably had a better view since he was 
standing on the same side of the street where the alleged 
incident took place. Davinifs information was in the police 
report. Defense counsel could have obtained a copy from which 
she would have had access to Davini's phone number and address. 
Thus, because defendant's trial counsel did not make a reasonable 
investigation into obtaining Davinifs phone number and address, 
the first part of the Strickland test has been met. 
Second, if Davini had been called as a witness, he would 
have testified as an eye witness that Appellant did not use 
unlawful force against Karen. (See Appellant's affidavit filed 
on June 8, 1994). Therefore, there is a reasonable probability 
that Appellant's trial would have been different had defense 
counsel adequately investigated Davini as a witness. 
Nevertheless, there have been cases where the courts have 
found that an investigation may not be necessary. However, they 
are distinguishable from Appellant's case. For instance, in 
State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1993), following a conviction 
of aggravated arson, the defendant appealed claiming ineffective 
assistance of counsel. The defendant claimed that his trial 
counsel failed to order an investigation. The Supreme Court of 
Utah found that because defendant's original attorney had already 
ordered an investigation, the new attorney did not need to order 
another one as she would have found out the same information had 
she performed an independent investigation. Tyler, 850 P.2d at 
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1255. 
Tyler is distinguishable from our case in that had the new 
attorney made an independent investigation, she would have found 
out nothing new. Thus, it would not have helped the defendant in 
any way. On the other hand, Davini's testimony, as the only 
other eye witness, would have posed a completely different story 
to the jury had he been called to testify. His testimony could 
have caused a different outcome in our case. 
Similarly, in State v. Callahan, 866 P.2d 590 (Utah App. 
1993) the defendant claimed that his trial counsel failed to 
interview and subpoena prospective defense witnesses in the 
assault trial. The Court of appeals found that it was not 
reasonable to expect counsel to try to locate customers who had 
lunch across the street from where the events in question 
happened based on the remote possibility that they saw the 
incident. Callahan, 866 P.2d at 594. Thus, the Court held that 
defendant did not meet the first prong of the Strickland test and 
thus, that trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance. 
Id. at 594. 
Callahan is distinguishable from our case because in our 
case, trial counsel only had to locate one crucial eye witness 
whose pertinent information was accessible through a police 
report. It was not unreasonable to expect trial counsel to try 
to locate a crucial eye witness whose testimony could have 
changed the outcome of the case by testifying that Appellant did 
not use unlawful force against the alleged victim. 
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Another case in which the Court of Appeals of Utah found 
ineffective assistance of counsel is salt Lake City v. Grotepas, 
874 P.2d 136 (Utah App. 1994). In that case, the trial counsel 
failed to investigate and raise a statutory defense to the 
trespass charge. Grotepas, 874 P.2d at 139. The court stated 
that by reason of the oversight, the defendant had established 
the first prong of the Strickland test. Id. at 139. "In 
addition, because an appropriate defense . . . instruction was 
necessary to insure that the defendant received a fair trial, the 
court determined that he was likely prejudiced by counsel's 
mistake . . . " Id. Finally, the court found that there was a 
reasonable probability that the verdict would have been more 
favorable to the defendant had counsel asserted the statutory 
defense, thus satisfying the second prong of the Strickland test. 
IcL. 
Of equal importance, trial counsel failed to subpoena the 
alleged victim's doctor even after Appellant provided her with 
the doctor's name and phone number. (See Appellant's Affidavit 
in Support of Motion to Dismiss dated December 20, 1993). 
Through her testimony, Karen's doctor would have informed the 
jury about Karen's anxiety attacks and what they entail. 
Unfortunately, because trial counsel failed to subpoena Karen's 
doctor, the jury only heard the prosecution's side of the story. 
Although trial counsel's failure to subpoena Karen's doctor could 
be viewed as a trial tactic, taking the circumstances of this 
case as a whole, a reasonable attorney would have subpoenaed 
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Karen's doctor in order to inform the jury about her illness and 
how it could have affected an outsider's perception of the events 
that took place on that day. Because any reasonable attorney 
would have subpoenaed Karen's doctor, trial counsel's performance 
fell below the reasonable objective standard, thus satisfying the 
first prong of the Strickland test. Further, had the doctor 
testified, there is a reasonable probability that the verdict 
would have been more favorable to the defendant, satisfying the 
second prong of the Strickland test. 
III. DEPRIVATION OF A DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO TESTIFY CANNOT 
BE VIEWED AS A TRIAL TACTIC AS THE ULTIMATE DECISION 
MUST REST WITH THE DEFENDANT 
Because trial counsel deprived Appellant of his right to 
testify even though Appellant wanted to testify in his own 
behalf, she rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. 
In United States v. Butts, 630 F.Supp. 1145 (D. Maine 1986), 
the defendant was deprived of testifying in his behalf on a 
conviction of possession of a stolen credit card. The district 
court, quoting from Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071 (5th Circ. 
1978), stated that M[tlo deny a defendant the right to tell his 
story from the stand dehumanizes the administration of justice." 
United States v. Butts. 630 F.Supp. 1145. Also, the court found 
that, "where the very point of a trial is to determine whether an 
individual was involved in criminal activity, the testimony of 
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the individual himself must be considered of prime importance." 
Id. at 1147. 
Essentially, the Court held that trial counsel's actions in 
not affording the defendant the opportunity to testify, affected 
the fairness of the trial process itself by resulting in the 
defendant being deprived of the opportunity to testify. Butts, 
630 F.Supp. at 1148. Consequently, the court found that trial 
counsel had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 
1149. 
More specifically, the Supreme Court of Colorado in People 
v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504 (Colo. 1984), found that "the 
constitutional right to testify is so fundamental that procedural 
safeguards are necessary to insure that the defendant understands 
the significance of waiver of this right." Curtis, 681 P.2d at 
509. 
In that case, the defendant was convicted of murder of the 
first degree. Curtisfs trial attorney stated that after hearing 
the prosecution's case he had decided that Curtis would not 
testify, and told him so. Curtis did not respond. Curtis did 
not know that the ultimate decision rested with him. Id. at 508. 
The Court in Curtis also found that a trial court has a duty 
to question a defendant on the record to ascertain whether waiver 
of his right to testify was made knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intentionally. Curtis, 681 P.2d at 516. 
Appellant would like to ask the Court to follow Colorado as 
to the issue of requiring the trial court to establish, on the 
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record, that defendant waived his right to testify knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intentionally. In the case at hand, it is not 
established anywhere on the record that Appellant waived his 
right to testify in his behalf. The trial court did not assure 
itself that Appellant made an informed decision. 
IV. 
BECAUSE DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO OBJECT TO PROSECUTION'S 
IMPROPER QUESTIONING WHICH ELICITED INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE, 
DEFENSE COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Throughout the trial defense counsel failed to object to 
questions which elicited prejudicial inadmissible statements that 
were either hearsay or irrelevant. Furthermore she, herself 
asked some questions which elicited damaging evidence to her own 
client. Therefore her assistance as counsel was ineffective, (see 
the numerous instances cataloged in the Statement of facts.) 
CONTUSION 
In summary, the United States Constitution, amendment VI 
provides that, r,ln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . • to have Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence." Particularly the Constitution requires the effective 
assistance of counsel. 
Appellant, to be successful must first show that counselfs 
performance was deficient. Second, the appellant must show that 
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. In the case at 
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hand defense counsel's representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness in that she did not adequately 
investigate the case and she failed to subpoena two crucial 
witnesses. 
Appellant wanted to testify on his own behalf, but 
counsel failed to afford him the opportunity. 
Finally, there is more than enough evidence to show 
that Appellant's trial counsel failed to object to highly 
prejudicial testimony thereby, in all probability, causing a 
different result than should have obtained. 
Therefore, appellant respectfully requests a reversal 
of the decision of the trial court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this thirtieth day of November, 1994. 
David L. Sanders 
Attorney for Appellant 
425 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed, postage prepaid, this 
twenty-second day of November, 1994, to: 
Virginia Ward 
Salt Lake City Prosecutor 
451 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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